KairoLock aims to make common self-bypass methods materially harder. It does not claim to prevent every bypass, and no bypass-resistance claim is marked verified before the Windows red-team suite passes.
Pre-release status: Windows enforcement testing is incomplete. Descriptions below are design targets and system boundaries, not verified performance claims.
Threat model
The intended adversary is the authorized device owner acting impulsively and attempting common local bypasses. The model does not promise resistance against a determined expert with physical access, modified hardware, alternate boot media, operating-system compromise, or destructive data loss.
Verification before claims
Release candidates must be tested against the documented red-team matrix. The public changelog and security page will distinguish tested behavior, known limitations, and unresolved cases.
Server-side entitlement
Trial and subscription state live on the authenticated server account. Privileged database and Paddle credentials remain on the server and are never embedded in the desktop client.
Data minimization
The marketing website does not need login, checkout, or activity data. The planned cloud layer stores only the identity, billing references, entitlement state, and release data needed to operate the product.
What KairoLock does not claim
Mathematical or absolute unbreakability.
Protection after the operating system or account is fully compromised.
Prevention of every recovery, repair, or destructive action available to a device owner.
Verified resistance to any bypass case that has not passed repeatable testing.
Disclosure path
A dedicated security contact and responsible disclosure timeline must be configured before public release. Until then, no production security intake address is being advertised.